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Abstract 
 
Average unemployment in Europe today is relatively high compared with OECD countries 
outside Europe.  The majority of countries in Europe today have lower unemployment than 
any OECD country outside Europe, including the US.  These two facts are consistent because 
the four largest countries in Continental Western Europe namely, France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, (the Big Four), have very high unemployment and most of the rest have comparatively 
low unemployment.  This variability is highly informative because the fifteen European 
countries which we consider have more or less independent labour markets in practice, 
despite ‘free’ movement of labour.  Using this information we see how changes in the 
structure of the various labour markets explain a substantial proportion of the secular 
fluctuations in unemployment in the various countries.  In particular, we pin down some of 
the particular factors which enable us to understand why some European countries have been 
able fully to recover from the unemployment disasters of the early 1980s whereas some have 
not. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The average unemployment rate in Europe in 2001 was 7.6%.  This is higher than in any of 
the developed countries of the OECD outside Europe1.  Interestingly, the inactivity rate in 
Europe has exactly the same property.  So, in this average sense, there is a European 
unemployment problem.  But averaging in this way is silly.  Europe, by which we mean 
Western Europe, consists of fifteen countries (we omit Luxembourg) with fifteen more or less 
independent labour markets.  As we shall see, it is how these labour markets operate which 
determines unemployment over the longer term.  And by 2002, nine of these fifteen labour 
markets were operating well enough to produce unemployment rates lower than in any of the 
non-European developed OECD countries including the US.  So why is average 
unemployment in Europe so high?  The answer is that unemployment is high in the four 
largest economies of Continental Western Europe, namely France, Germany, Italy and Spain.  
Exclude these four countries and the famous European unemployment problem more or less 
disappears. 
In what follows, we pursue these issues.  In the next section, we present an overview 
of labour supply in the developed OECD countries simply to set the scene for our ana lysis of 
unemployment.  Then in Section 3, we discuss how we might explain large secular shifts in 
unemployment and the circumstances in which changes in the operation of the labour market 
would provide such an explanation.  In Section 4 we discuss which labour market institutions 
might be expected to relate to unemployment over the longer term and then, in Section 5, we 
summarise some of the evidence on this issue.  Finally, in Section 6, we look at what has 
actually happened to labour market institutions in the last four decades in our group of OECD 
countries.  Then we see whether we can explain the significant differences in unemployment 
performance across Europe since the early 1980s. 
 
 
2. An Overall Picture of Labour Supply 
 
Although we shall be concentrating on unemployment in what follows, it is helpful to look at 
some more general background information on various aspects of labour supply.  In Table 1, 
we present the aggregate picture in 2001 and 2002.  Taking the very latest unemployment 
                                                                 
1 Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, US. 
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data, the first striking point, which we have already noted - that there is not a European 
unemployment problem.  Most European economies have lower levels of unemployment than 
the OECD countries outside Europe including the United States.  The problem lies in the 
large countries of Continental Western Europe, namely France, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
henceforward referred to as the Big Four.  Of the other eleven countries of Western Europe in 
the table, nine currently have relatively low unemployment 2, the exceptions being Belgium 
and Finland.  By and large, the European countries with high unemployment rates tend to 
have high inactivity rates and low employment rates as well.  The Big Four and Belgium all 
have employment rates below 66% with only Ireland of the rest joining this group.  With the 
exception of Germany, the Big Four, Belgium and Ireland also have inactivity rates in excess 
of 30 per cent. 
 A second point worth noting is the pattern of long-term unemployment rates (over 12 
months), set out in Table 2.  Here we see that while the short-term unemployment rate in the 
European Union is relatively low at 4.3%, the long-term rate far exceeds that outside Europe.  
The Big Four and Belgium all have long-term unemployment rates between 3% and 6%, 
many times the equivalent rates of the non-European countries.  High long-term rates 
obviously reflect barriers to re-entry into the job market, once having lost a job. 
 In Tables 3 and 4, we present unemployment, inactivity and employment rates for a 
variety of sub-groups of the working age population to illustrate the wide variations in the 
patterns across age and gender groupings.  Focussing first on prime age men (age 25-54), we 
see that even among this group, in most countries more are inactive than are unemployed.  
Furthermore, the inactivity rate in this group is higher in the US than in the European Union.  
Interestingly, most inactive men in this age group are classified as sick or disabled, the 
majority of whom are claiming some form of state benefit.  Furthermore, the size of this 
disability group has risen substantially since the 1970s in nearly every country, and in those 
which have been analysed, this increase has been driven by changes in the entry rules and the 
available benefits (see Bound and Burkhauser, 1999, for some evidence). 
Among older men, unemployment rates are generally much the same as for prime age 
men, but inactivity rates are enormously larger and vary dramatically from one country to 
another.  In some European countries, more than half the older men are inactive, whereas in 
Norway and Sweden, the inactivity rate is closer to one quarter.  As Blondal and Scarpetta 
(1998) note, these large cross-country variations were not apparent as recently as 1971, when 
                                                                 
2 Of course, we are currently gradually recovering from a relatively mild recession, but most countries in the 
OECD are at similar stages in the cycle, so this is not causing significant distortions. 
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nearly all the countries had inactivity rates for this group below 20 per cent, the major 
exception being Italy with a rate of 41 per cent, (see Blondal and Scarpetta, 1998, Table V.1, 
p.72).  The main factor explaining the current variations and the consequent large changes 
since 1971 has been the structure of the social security system.  Incentives for men to stay in 
the labour force vary widely, with generous incentives to retire early being introduced in 
many countries.  This was often done in order to reduce labour supply in the mistaken view 
that this would help to resolve the problem of unemployment.  As a consequence, with the 
exception of Spain, all of the Big Four and Belgium have exceptionally high inactivity rates 
among older men on top of their exceptionally high unemployment rates. 
Inactivity rates among women aged 25 to 54 also vary widely, with the Scandinavian 
countries having the lowest rates in the OECD, and Italy and Spain having the highest.  While 
the majority of inactive women in this age group report themselves as looking after the ir 
family, Italy and Spain also have the lowest fertility rates in the OECD.  What is important 
here is the structure of the tax system, particularly the marginal tax rate facing wives when 
their husbands work3, and the existence of barriers to part-time work. 
Finally, it is worth noting how unemployment in Italy, Spain and to a lesser extent 
France is heavily concentrated among young people and women.  This is partly due to the 
role of employment protection laws in generating barriers to employment for new entrants 
and partly due to the social mores surrounding entry into work.  For example, in Italy many 
young people, particularly if they are well qualified, will live at home for many years without 
working but effectively queuing for a particularly desirable job and contributing to measured 
unemployment (although perhaps not to true unemployment). 
Overall, therefore, it is clear that the unemployed are not the only relevant group 
when it comes to analysing labour supply.  Indeed, it is generally the case that there are 
significant flows into employment from the inactive which are, in many countries, as large as 
the flows from unemployment.  But there are many more inactive than unemployed, so the 
probability per period that an unemployed person gets a job is generally several times higher 
than the probability per period that an inactive person gets a job.  Thus the unemployed are 
the significant group of potential suppliers of labour since they are the group who are actively 
searching for and obtaining work at a substantial rate.  So, in the remainder of what follows, 
this is the group on which we shall focus. 
 
                                                                 
3 A key issue here is whether husbands and wives are taxed jointly or separately.  See OECD (1990), Table 6.3. 
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3.  Explaining Secular Shifts in Unemployment 
 
Before discussing how we might explain why unemployment changes such a lot over time, 
we start with a general picture of the period from 1960 presented in Table 5.  Note that in this 
table, the numbers for Germany refer to West Germany and the numbers for Italy have been 
subject to some correction described in the table.  Both these changes have been made to try 
and ensure some degree of consistency over time.  Looking at the table, we see that 
unemployment was very low in the 1960s with the notable exceptions of Canada, Ireland and 
the United States.  Today, there is only one country with unemployment lower than in the 
early 1960s, namely Ireland, although Austria, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and the US 
have seen very small increases over what were very low levels in the case of the first four 
countries.  By contrast, the Big Four have unemployment today far in excess of its level in 
the early 1960s.  Like most countries, their unemployment rates took off in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s but unusually they have remained high ever since.  These patterns are the main 
focus of our interest, so how might this be explained? 
 
Some basic analysis 
 
The level of employment, and hence unemployment, is determined by aggregate demand 4.  
This is influenced by many factors, mostly outside the direct control of policy makers.  
Monetary policy is, however, directly controlled by policy makers and has a significant 
impact on aggregate demand.  These days, monetary policy tends to be set in order to 
stabilise inflation at relatively low levels.  Suppose, as a result of adverse shocks, aggregate 
demand is low, unemployment is high and the economy is in a recession.  Then monetary 
policy will be loosened, aggregate demand will recover and unemployment will start falling.  
At some point in this recovery, the economy will run into labour shortages and inflationary 
pressure.  In anticipation of inflation moving above target, monetary policy is then tightened.  
They key issue is how much unemployment remains before labour shortages become 
excessive and inflation starts to rise.  This level of unemployment may be thought of as the 
equilibrium or sustainable rate at which there is no systematic tendency for inflation to rise or 
fall, (so it is also called the NAIRU). 
                                                                 
4 There is obviously some short-run slippage between aggregate demand and employment accounted for by 
variation in inventories and the intensity of work by employees.  This is not germane to the main thrust of the 
argument in the text. 
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 By and large, variations in this equilibrium rate of unemployment, through time and 
across countries, will lie behind the broad patterns of unemployment we observe in Table 5.  
So explaining the equilibrium rate is the key problem.  Of course, aggregate demand 
determines unemployment, so variations in aggregate demand (relative to trend) will  
‘explain’ precisely the observed patterns of unemployment.  But this is more of a tautology 
than an explanation.  A country will suffer from persistently high unemployment, that is 
persistently ‘low’ aggregate demand, if its equilibrium level of unemployment is high.  
Because then, any attempt to raise aggregate demand and hence lower unemployment will 
run into the inflation constraint.  For example, in the UK in the late 1980s, aggregate demand 
rose rapidly from 1986 and unemployment fell from 11.2% in that year to 8.6% in 1988 and 
7.2% in 1989.  Unfortunately, over the same period retail price inflation rose from 3.4% in 
1986 to 4.9% in 1988 and 7.8% in 1989.  Monetary policy was tightened dramatically and the 
short-term interest rate rose from around 8% in the spring of 1988 to 15% by the winter of 
1989.  Unemployment increased from its low point of 6.9% in 1990 to a high of 10.2% in 
1993 as the direct consequence of this monetary tightening.  It is clear from these data that 
equilibrium unemployment must have been well above the 1990 low point because inflation 
was rising quite rapidly well before this point was reached.  By contrast, in the late 1990s, 
UK unemployment fell well below this 1990 low point with no inflationary consequences 
whatever, suggesting a significant decline in equilibrium unemployment. 
 A second interesting example is the Eurozone in the late 1990s.  The Eurozone is, of 
course, dominated in size by the big four Continental European economies, France, Germany, 
Italy and Spain.  A picture of events for 1994-2002 is set out in Table 6.  As a general rule of 
thumb, monetary policy, as captured by short-term interest rates, impacts on demand with a 
lag of about a year and on inflation in a further year.  Early in the period, monetary policy 
was quite tight, domestic demand growth was relatively modest, unemployment was nearly 
11% and the inflation rate was falling.  Monetary policy was eased during the late 1990s, 
domestic demand growth expanded and unemployment started falling.  However, by early 
2000, inflation had started to move above the ECB target range 5 even though unemployment 
was still above 8%.  As a consequence, monetary policy was tightened throughout 2000.  
Despite subsequent easing, particularly in late 2001, domestic demand fell rapidly from the 
second half of 2000 and unemployment started to rise from a low point of 7.8% in late 2001.6  
                                                                 
5 2% is at the top of the ECB target range. 
6 Of course, the US economy turned down in 2001 and this would have had some additional impact on the 
Eurozone.  However, looking closely at the data, we see that in 2000/2, GDP growth has exceeded the growth of 
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Despite this, inflation remains above the ECB target range.  The lesson from this episode 
appears to be that in the Eurozone, the reduction in unemployment generated by monetary 
policy easing in the late 1990s hit the inflation constraint in 2000 and monetary policy had to 
be tightened to stop inflation rising further.  This prevented Eurozone unemployment falling 
much below 8%.  On the basis of this example, it is hard to see how average equilibrium 
unemployment in the Eurozone can be below 8%, a relatively high level, particularly as 
unemployment in most of the small Eurozone countries has been well below this level for 
many years. 
 
Can unemployment deviate from its equilibrium level for long periods? 
 
These are typical examples of how actual unemployment fluctuates around its equilibrium 
level.  But it is not always like this.  On some occasions, countries may suffer from high 
levels of unemployment for long periods of time either because they experience an 
overwhelming adverse demand shock from which it takes a very long time to recover or 
because macroeconomic policy is persistently perverse.  In the former case, we may observe 
unemployment well above its equilibrium rate, although falling back towards it.  In this case 
inflation may not fall, although unemployment is above its equilibrium rate, because the very 
fact that unemployment is falling will, itself, typically generate upward inflationary pressure.  
This offsets the downward inflationary pressure produced by the high level of 
unemployment.7  In the latter case, unemployment which is kept above its equilibrium rate 
will tend simply to generate falling inflation.  Good examples of these two cases are provided 
by Finland and Japan.  In Finland, a combination of poor policy decisions including a 
mishandled deregulation of the financial sector produced a huge adverse demand shock in the 
early 1990s which was reinforced by the collapse of trade with the Soviet Union.  
Consequently, as we can see in Table 7, unemployment rose from 3.2% to 16.4% in three 
years.  From 1994 onwards, unemployment has fallen steadily without any serious 
inflationary consequences.  This is a good example of unemployment being above the 
equilibrium rate for a decade but steadily falling back, simply as the consequence of an 
enormous adverse demand shock. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
final domestic demand in every quarter, indicating a positive contribution of net trade (plus inventories) 
throughout.  Furthermore, from the peak of GDP growth [2000 (ii)] to the trough [2002 (i)], GDP growth fell by 
3.8 percentage points and the final domestic demand contribution fell by 3.5 percentage points.  So the vast 
majority of the fall arises domestically. 
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 The example of Japan is different.  From 1990 on, unemployment has been rising 
throughout and, with a brief hiccup, inflation has been falling, turning negative in 1999.  This 
suggests that unemployment has been above the equilibrium rate for a long time which 
equally suggests that something has gone wrong on the macro policy front. 
 Aside from these types of exceptions, the longer-term patterns of unemployment tend 
to be dominated by shifts in the equilibrium rate.  One way of checking on this is to look at 
two groups of European countries.  In the first group are France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the 
Big Four.  In the second group are Denmark, Netherlands and the UK.  From Table 5, we see 
that unemployment in the period 1973-79 was much the same in all these countries.  Then in 
the 1980s unemployment rose substantially, again in all these countries.  But by 2000-01, 
unemployment in the Big Four remained around twice as high as in the 1973-79 period.  By 
contrast, in the second group, unemployment was roughly the same in 2000-01 as in 1973-79.  
This suggests that equilibrium unemployment is much higher today in the Big Four than it 
was in 1973-79 whereas, in the second group, equilibrium unemployment is today at roughly 
the same level as in the 1970s.  We can see this clearly by looking at the relationship between 
unemployment and vacancies (the Beveridge Curve).  When vacancies are high, 
unemployment should be relatively low, because it is easy for unemployed people to find 
work.  Yet, strikingly, in France, West Germany and Spain vacancies in recent years have 
been extremely high by historical standards, despite high unemployment.  (There are no 
vacancy data for Italy.)  It is this high level of vacancies which helped to generate increasing 
European inflation in 1999/2000, which led to higher interest rates and the end of the 
European recovery, as we have already noted.  This situation is shown in Figure 1.  In all 
three countries vacancies in 2000/1 were far higher than in the late 1970s.  One might have 
expected unemployment in 2000/1 to be lower.  But, in fact, it was more than double, as we 
have already noted. 
 In the second group of countries shown in Figure 2, we see that just as in the first 
group, unemployment rose significantly relative to vacancies in the 1980s.  But, in the 1990s, 
in contrast to the Big Four, there was a backward shift in unemployment relative to vacancies 
so that by the end of the 1990s, the unemployment/vacancy loci were back at their 1975 
positions. 
So on the basis of these arguments, we may conclude that, aside from some notable 
exceptions, the secular shifts in unemployment which we have seen are driven by shifts in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
7 This is a standard consequence of hysteresis in the unemployment process.  There is a discussion on p.382 of 
Layard et al. (1991). 
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equilibrium rate, the major exceptions in the 1990s being Finland and Japan.  So the next step 
is to discuss the factors which impact on the equilibrium unemployment rate. 
 
 
4.  The Determinants of the Equilibrium Rate 
 
There are innumerable detailed theories of unemployment in the long run.  These may be 
divided into two broad groups, those based on flow models and those based on stock models.  
Pissarides (1990) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) provide good surveys of the former 
model type.  Blanchard and Katz (1999) presents a general template for the latter models.  
Fundamentally, all the models have the same broad implications. The equilibrium level of 
unemployment is affected first, by any variable which influences the ease with which 
unemployed individuals can be matched to available job vacancies, and second, by any 
variable which tends to raise wages in a direct fashion despite excess supply in the labour 
market.  There may be variables common to both sets.  Finally, both groups of variables will 
tend to impact on real wages in the same direction as they influence equilibrium 
unemployment, essentially because equilibrium labour demand, which is negatively related to 
wages, has to move in the opposite direction to equilibrium unemployment. 
Before going on to consider these variables in more detail, it is worth noting that the 
first group of variables mentioned above will tend to impact on the position of the 
unemployment/vacancy locus or Beveridge Curve, whereas the second will not do so in any 
direct fashion.  However, this division is not quite as clear cut as it might appear at first sight 
(see below).  What we can say, nevertheless is that any variable which shifts the Beveridge 
Curve to the right will increase equilibrium unemployment.  So a shift of the Beveridge 
Curve is a sufficient but not necessary sign that equilibrium unemployment has changed. 
We turn now to consider a series of variables which we might expect to influence 
equilibrium unemployment either because of their impact on the effectiveness with which the 
unemployed are matched to available jobs or because of their direct effect on wages.  The 
unemployment benefit system directly affects the readiness of the unemployed to fill 
vacancies.  Aspects of the system which are clearly important are the level of benefits, their 
coverage, the length of time for which they are available and the strictness with which the 
system is operated.  Related to unemployment benefits is the availability of other resources to 
those without jobs.  These include the returns on non-human wealth which may be increasing 
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in the real interest rate.   (See Phelps, 1994, for an extensive discussion.)  Employment 
protection laws may tend to make firms more cautious about filling vacancies which slows 
the speed at which the unemployed move into work.  This obviously reduces the efficiency of 
job matching.  However, the mechanism here is not clear-cut.  For example, the introduction 
of employment laws often leads to an increased professionalisation of the personnel function 
within firms, as was the case in Britain in the 1970s (see Daniel and Stilgoe, 1978).  This can 
increase the efficiency of job matching.  So, in terms of outflows from unemployment, the 
impact of employment protection laws can go either way.  By contrast, it seems clear that 
such laws will tend to reduce involuntary separations and hence lower inflows into 
unemployment.  So the overall impact on the Beveridge Curve and hence on unemployment 
is an empirical question.  Furthermore, employment law may also have a direct impact on pay 
since it raises the job security of existing employees encouraging them to demand higher pay 
increases. 
Anything which makes it easier to match the unemployed to the available vacancies 
will shift the Beveridge Curve to the left and reduce equilibrium unemployment.  Factors 
which operate in this way include the reduction of barriers to mobility which may be 
geographical or occupational.  Furthermore numerous government policies are concerned to 
increase the ability and willingness of the unemployed to take jobs.  These are grouped under 
the heading of active labour market policies. 
Turning now to those factors which have a direct impact on wages, the obvious place 
to start is the institutional structure of wage determination.  Within every country there is a 
variety of structures.  In some sectors wages are determined more of less competitively but in 
others wages are bargained between employers and trade unions at the level of the 
establishment, firm or even industry.  The overall outcome depends on union power in wage 
bargains, union coverage and the degree of co-ordination of wage bargains.  Generally, 
greater union power and coverage can be expected to exert upward pressure on wages, hence 
raising equilibrium unemployment, but this can be offset if union wage setting across the 
economy is co-ordinated.   
The final group of variables which directly impacts on wages falls under the heading 
of real wage resistance.  The idea here is that workers attempt to sustain recent rates of real 
wage growth when the rate consistent with stable employment shifts unexpectedly.  For 
example, if there is an adverse shift in the terms of trade, real consumption wages must fall if 
employment is not to decline.  If workers persist in attempting to bargain for rates of real 
wage growth which take no account of the movement in the terms of trade, this will tend to 
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raise unemployment.  Exactly the same argument applies if there is an unexpected fall in 
trend productivity growth or an increase in labour taxes.  For example, if labour taxes 
(payroll tax rates plus income tax rates plus consumption tax rates) go up, the real post-tax 
consumption wage must fall if real labour costs per employee facing firms are not to rise.  
Any resistance to this fall will lead to a rise in unemployment.  This argument suggests that 
increases in real import prices, falls in trend productivity growth or rises in the labour tax rate 
may lead to a temporary increase in unemployment. 
However, it may be argued that changes in labour taxes may have a permanent impact 
on unemployment depending on the extent to which the taxes are shifted onto labour.  A key 
issue here is the extent to which benefits or the value of leisure adjust in proportion to post-
tax earnings (see Pissarides 1998, for example). 
To summarise, the variables which we might expect to influence equilibrium 
unemployment include the unemployment benefit system, the real interest rate, employment 
protection laws, barriers to labour mobility, active labour market policies, union structures 
and the extent of co-ordination in wage bargaining, labour taxes, and unexpected shifts in the 
terms of trade and trend productivity growth.  So the interesting question is, to what extent 
can we explain the secular shifts in unemployment by changes in the, mainly institutional, 
variables noted above?  
 
 
5.  Labour Market Institutions and Unemployment Patterns 
 
The purpose of this section is to consider whether it has proved possible to explain the 
unemployment patterns shown in Table 5 by variations over time and across countries in the 
sort of labour market institutions discussed in the previous section.  Cross-country variation 
in post-1980s unemployment is easy enough to explain by cross-country variation in labour 
market institutions (see, for example, Layard et al., 1991, p.55;  Scarpetta, 1996;  Nickell, 
1997, Elmeskov et al., 1998;  Nickell and Layard 1999).  More interesting and more tricky is 
to explain the time series variation from the 1960s onward. 
There are several different approaches that have been used.  First there is a basic 
division between studies that use econometric techniques to fit the data and those which use 
calibrated models which typically distinguish between a stylised ‘European’ economy and a 
stylised ‘United States’ economy.  Second there is another division between those which 
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focus on changes in the institutions and those which consider ‘shocks’ or baseline factors 
which shift over time and are typically interacted with average levels of institutional factors: 
Looking first at panel data econometric models which interact stable institutions with 
shocks or baseline variables, good examples include Layard et al. (1991), Chapter 9 (p. 430-
37); Blanchard and Wolfers (2000); Bertola et al. (2001) and Fitoussi et al. (2000).  All these 
focus on the time series variation in the data by including country dummies.  Layard et al. 
(1991) present a dynamic model of unemployment based on annual data where the baseline 
variables include wage pressure (a dummy which takes the value one from 1970), the benefit 
replacement ratio, real import price changes and monetary shocks.  Their impact on 
unemployment differs across countries, since it depends on time invariant institutions, with 
different sets of institutions affecting the degree of unemployment persistence, the impact of 
wage pressure variables including the replacement rate and import prices, and the effect of 
monetary shocks.  The model explains the data better than individual country autoregressions 
with trends. 
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) use five year averages to concentrate on long-run 
effects.  The shocks or baseline variables consist of the level of TFP growth, the real interest 
rate, the change in inflation and labour demand shifts (essentially the log of labour’s share 
purged of the impact of factor prices).  With the exception of the change in inflation, these 
‘shocks’ are not mean reverting which is why we prefer the term baseline variables.  These 
variables are driving unemployment, so that, for example, the fact that annual TFP growth is 
considerably higher in the 1960s than in the 1990s in most countries is an important reason 
why unemployment is typically higher in the latter period.  Quite why this should be so is not 
wholly clear.  Many mechanisms are discussed in Saint-Paul (1991) but there is no evidence 
that they are important or robust in Bean and Pissarides (1993) for example.  Nevertheless, 
interacting these observed baseline variables with time invariant institutional variables fits the 
data well.  In an alternative investigation, Blanchard and Wolfers replace the observed shock 
variables with unobserved common shocks represented by time dummies.  When these are 
interacted with time invariant institutions, the explanatory power of the model increases 
substantially. 
The basic Blanchard and Wolfers model is extended in Bertola et al. (2001) who 
include an additional baseline variable, namely the share of young people (age 15-24) in the 
population over 15 years old.  The model explains a substantial proportion of the divergence 
between US and other countries unemployment rates (48 to 63 percent) over the period 1970 
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to 1995, although an even higher proportion is explained when the observed baseline 
variables are replaced by time dummies. 
Fitoussi et al. (2000) proceed in a slightly different way.  First they interact the 
baseline variables with country dummies and then investigate the cross-section relationship 
between these and labour market institutions.  The baseline variables include non-wage 
support (income from private wealth plus social spending) relative to labour productivity and 
the real price of oil as well as two in common with Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), namely 
the real rate of interest and productivity growth.  In all these four papers, the explanation of 
long-run changes in unemployment has the same structure.  The changes depend on long-run 
shifts in a set of baseline variables, with the impact of these being much bigger and longer-
lasting in some countries than others because of stable institutional differences.  The 
persuasiveness of these explanations depends on whether the stories associated with the 
baseline variables are convincing.  For example, the notion that a fall in trend productivity 
growth, a rise in the real price of oil or a downward shift in the labour demand curve leads to 
a permanent rise in equilibrium unemployment in one which many might find unappealing. 
An interesting alternative, still in the context of the institutions/shocks framework is 
the calibration analysis discussed in Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998).  The idea here is that in 
‘Europe’, benefits are high with a long duration of eligibility whereas in the ‘United States’, 
benefits are modest and of fixed duration.  In a world where turbulence is low, the probability 
of large skill losses among the unemployed is low and the difference in the unemployment 
rates in ‘Europe’ and the ‘United States’ is minimal, because the chances of an unemployed 
person in ‘Europe’ finding a job with wages exceeding the benefit level are high.  In a world 
where turbulence is high, the probability of large skill losses among the unemployed is high.  
As a consequence the high level of benefits relative to past earnings and hence the high 
reservation wage in ‘Europe’ now bites and unemployment is much higher than in the 
‘United States’.  So we have a situation where the relevant institution, namely the benefit 
system, remains stable but the consequences are very different in a world of high turbulence 
from those in a world of low turbulence. 
While this model captures a particular feature of the situation, in order for it to be a 
persuasive explanation of recent history it must pass two tests.  First, we need evidence that 
turbulence has indeed increased and second it must explain why many countries in Europe 
now have relatively low unemployment.  Indeed the variation in unemployment (and 
employment) rates across European countries is far larger than the difference between Europe 
and the United States.  To justify the assumption of increasing turbulence, Ljungqvist and 
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Sargent point to the increasing variance of transitory earnings in the United States reported by 
Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994).  There has also been a rise in the transitory variance in the 
UK, noted by Dickens (2000).  However these facts hardly add up to a full empirical test of 
the theory.  For example, in Europe, TFP growth has been much lower since 1976 than it was 
in the earlier period and we might expect TFP growth to be positively associated with 
turbulence.  Indeed, the fall in TFP growth is one of the main factors generating a rise in 
unemployment in Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).  Furthermore, there is no evidence of any 
significant changes in the rates of job creation and job destruction over the relevant period 
(see Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999).  Finally, no evidence is presented which explains why the 
various European countries have such widely differing unemployment patterns.  So while the 
Lungqvist/Sargent model may capture an element of the story, it hardly comes close to a full 
explanation. 
Turning now to studies which simply rely on changing institutions to explain 
unemployment patterns, notable examples include Belot and Van Ours (2000, 2001) and 
Nickell et al. (2002).  The former papers provide a good explanation of changes in 
unemployment in eighteen OECD countries, although in order to do so they make extensive 
use of interactions between institutions, something which has a sound theoretical foundation 
(see Coe and Snower, 1997, for example).  Their model is, however, static like that of 
Blanchard and Wolfers.  The model developed by Nickell et al. (2002) uses annual data and 
since they explain actual unemployment, they include in their model those factors which 
might explain the short-run deviations of unemployment from its equilibrium level.  
Following the discussion in Hoon and Phelps (1992) or Phelps (1994) these factors include 
aggregate demand shocks, productivity shocks and wage shocks.  More specifically, they 
include the following: 
i) money supply shocks, specifically changes in the rate of growth of the nominal 
money stock (i.e. the second difference of the log money supply); 
ii) productivity shocks, measured by changes in TFP growth or deviations of TFP growth 
from trend; 
iii)  labour demand shocks, measured by the residuals from a simple labour demand 
model; 
iv) real import price shocks, measured by proportional changes in real import prices 
weighted by the trade share; 
v) the (ex-post) real interest rate. 
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With the exception of the real interest rate, these variables are genuine ‘shocks’ in the 
sense that they are typically stationary and tend to revert to their mean quite rapidly.  This 
distinguishes them from the ‘baseline variables’ used in Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), for 
example.  On top of these variables, Nickell et al. (2002) then use such time series of the 
institutional variables as are available including employment protection, the benefit 
replacement rate, benefit duration, union density, co-ordination and employment taxes.  
These variables are there to explain equilibrium unemployment.  Using a dynamic panel data 
model, the time series patterns of unemployment are well explained.  Based on dynamic 
simulations keeping institutions fixed at their 1960s values, it is found that the institutional 
variables which are included explain about 55% of the individual country changes in 
unemployment from the 1960s to the early 1990s.  This is reasonable, particularly as the early 
1990s was a period of deep recession in much of Europe. 
Overall, therefore, there is some evidence that the sort of labour market institutions 
discussed in the previous section made a significant contribution to explaining the patterns of 
unemployment reported in Table 5.  So, as a final step, let us see how these institutional 
variables have changed over time and what these changes can tell us about why the European 
Big Four countries have performed less well than most other countries on the unemployment 
front in the 1990s.  
 
 
6.  Changes in Labour Market Institutions and their Impact 
 
In this section we look at changes in benefit systems, wage determination, employment 
protection and labour taxes in the last decades of the 20th Century and see what they can tell 
us. 
 
The unemployment benefit system 
 
There are four aspects of the unemployment benefit system for which there are good 
theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that they will influence equilibrium 
unemployment.  These are, in turn, the level of benefits8, the duration of entitlement9, the 
                                                                 
8 A good general reference is Holmlund (1998).  A useful survey of micro studies can be found in OECD 
(1994), Chapter 8.  Micro evidence from policy changes is contained in Carling et al. (1999), Hunt (1995) and 
Harkman (1997), and from experiments in Meyer (1995).  Cross-country macro evidence is available in Nickell 
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coverage of the system10 and the strictness with which the system is operated.11  Of these, 
only the first two are available as time series for the OECD countries.  The OECD has 
collected systematic data on the unemployment benefit replacement ratio for three different 
family types (single, with dependent spouse, with spouse at work) in three different duration 
categories (1st year, 2nd and 3rd years, 4th and 5th years) from 1961 to 1999 (every other year).  
(See OECD, 1994, Table 8.1 for the 1991 data).  From this we derive a measure of the benefit 
replacement ratio, equal to the average over family types in the 1st year duration category and 
a measure of benefit duration equal to [0.6 (2nd and 3rd year replacement ratio) + 0.4 (4th and 
5th year replacement ratio)] ÷ (1st year replacement ratio).  So our measure of benefit duration 
is the level of benefit in the later years of the spell normalised on the benefit in the first year 
of the spell.  A summary of these data is presented in Tables 8 and 9. 
The key feature of these data is that in nearly all countries, benefit replacement ratios 
have tended to become more generous from the 1960s to the late 1970s, the exceptions being 
Germany, Japan and New Zealand.  Italy had no effective benefit system over this period for 
the vast majority of the unemployed.  After the late 1970s, countries moved in different 
directions.  Italy introduced a benefit system and those in Finland, Portugal and Switzerland 
became markedly more generous.  By contrast, benefit replacement ratios in Belgium, Ireland 
the UK have fallen steadily since the late 1970s or early 1980s. 
  It is unfortunate that we have no comprehensive time series data on the coverage of 
the system or on the strictness with which it is administered.  This is particularly true in the 
case of the latter because the evidence we possess appears to indicate that this is of crucial 
importance in determining the extent to which a generous level of benefit will actually 
influence unemployment.  For example, Denmark, which has very generous unemployment 
benefits (see Tables 8, 9), totally reformed the operation of its benefit system through the 
1990s with a view to tightening the criteria for benefit receipt and the enforcement of these 
criteria via a comprehensive system of sanctions.  The Danish Ministry of Labour is 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
and Layard (1999), Scarpetta (1996) and Elmeskov et al. (1998).  The average of their results indicates a 1.11 
percentage point rise in equilibrium unemployment for every 10 percentage point rise in the benefit replacement 
ratio. 
9 There is fairly clear micro evidence that shorter benefit entitlement leads to shorter unemployment duration 
(see Ham and Rea, 1987; Katz and Meyer, 1990 and Carling et al., 1996). 
10 Variations in the coverage of unemployment benefits are large (see OECD, 1994, Table 8.4) and there is a 
strong positive correlation between coverage and the level of benefit (OECD, 1994, p.190).  Bover et al. (1998) 
present strong evidence for Spain and Portugal that the covered exit unemployment more slowly than the 
uncovered. 
11 There is strong evidence that the strictness with which the benefit system is operated, at given levels of 
benefit, is a very important determinant of unemployment duration.  Micro evidence for the Netherlands may be 
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convinced that this process has played a major role in allowing Danish unemployment to fall 
dramatically since the early 1990s without generating inflationary pressure (see Danish 
Ministry of Finance, 1999, Chapter 2).  Just to see some of the ways in which systems of 
administration vary across country, in Table 10 we present indices of the strictness of the 
work availability conditions in various countries.  These are based on eight sub-indicators 
referring to the rules relating to the types of jobs that unemployed individuals must accept or 
incur some financial or other penalty.  We can see that countries with notable lax systems in 
the mid-1990s include Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland and the UK, although 
Ireland and the UK have significantly tightened their benefit operations since that time.  
 A further aspect of the structure of the benefit system for which we do not have 
detailed data back to the 1960s are those policies grouped under the heading of active labour 
market policies (ALMP).  We do, however, have data from 1985 which we present in Table 
11.  The purpose of these is to provide active assistance to the unemployed which will 
improve their chances of obtaining work.  Multi-country studies basically using cross section 
information indicate that ALMPs do have a negative impact on unemployment (e.g. 
Scarpetta, 1996; Nickell, 1997; Elmeskov et al., 1998).  This broad brush evidence is backed 
up by numbers of microeconometric studies (see Katz, 1998; Martin, 2000 or Martin and 
Grubb, 2001 for useful surveys) which show that under some circumstances, active labour 
market policies are effective.  In particular, job search assistance tends to have consistently 
positive outcomes but other types of measure such as employment subsidies and labour 
market training must be well designed if they are to have a significant impact (see Martin, 
2000, for a detailed analysis). 
Turning to the numbers, we see that, by and large, the countries of Northern Europe 
and Scandinavia devote most resources to ALMPs.  It might be hypothesised that they do this 
because high expenditure on ALMPs is required to offset their rather generous 
unemployment benefit systems and to push unemployed individuals into work.  Such 
additional pressure on the unemployed is not required if benefits are very low relative to 
potential earnings in work. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
found in Abbring et al. (1999) and Van Den Berg et al. (1999).  Cross country evidence is available in the 
Danish Ministry of Finance (1999), Chapter 2 and in OECD (2000), Chapter 4. 
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Systems of wage determination 
 
In most countries in the OECD, the majority of workers have their wages set by collective 
bargaining between employers and trade unions at the plant, firm, industry or aggregate level.  
This is important for our purposes because there is some evidence that trade union power in 
wage setting has a significant impact on unemployment.12  Unfortunately, we do not have 
complete data on collective bargaining coverage (the proportion of employees covered by 
collective agreements) but the data presented in Table 12 give a reasonable picture.  Across 
most of Continental Europe, including Scandinavia but excluding Switzerland, coverage is 
both high and stable.  As we shall see, this is either because most people belong to trade 
unions or because union agreements are extended by law to cover non-members in the same 
sector.  In Switzerland and in the OECD countries outside Continental Europe and 
Scandinavia, coverage is generally much lower with the exception of Australia.  In the UK, 
the US and New Zealand, coverage has declined with the fall in union density, there being no 
extension laws. 
 In Table 13, we present the percentage of employees who are union members.  Across 
most of Scandinavia, membership tends to be high.  By contrast, in much of Continental 
Europe and in Australia, union density tends to be less than 50% and is gradually declining.  
In these countries there is, consequently, a wide and widening gap between density and 
coverage which it is the job of the extension laws to fill.  This situation is at its most stark in 
France, which has the lowest union density in the OECD at around 10 percent, but one of the 
highest levels of coverage (around 95 percent).  Outside these regions, both density and 
coverage tend to be relatively low and both are declining at greater or lesser rates.  The 
absence of complete coverage data means that we have to rely on the density variable to 
capture the impact of unionisation on unemployment.  As should be clear, this is only half the 
story, so we must treat any results we find in this area with some caution.   
The other aspect of wage bargaining which appears to have a significant impact on 
wages and unemployment is the extent to which bargaining is coordinated13, 14.  Roughly 
                                                                 
12 See the discussion in Nickell and Layard (1999), Section 8 and Booth et al. (2000) (particularly around Table 
6.2) for positive evidence. 
13 See the discussion in Nickell and Layard (1999), Section 8, Booth et al. (2000) (particularly around Table 6.1) 
and OECD (1997), Chapter 3. 
14 One aspect of wage determination which we do not analyse in this paper is minimum wages.  This is for two 
reasons.  First, the balance of the evidence suggests that minimum wages are generally low enough not to have 
much of an impact on employment except for young people.  Second, only around half the OECD countries had 
statutory minimum wages over the period 1960-95.  Of course, trade unions may enforce “minimum wages” but 
  
 
18 
speaking, the evidence suggests that if bargaining is highly co-ordinated, this will completely 
offset the adverse effects of unionism on employment (see Nickell and Layard, 1999, for 
example).  Co-ordination refers to mechanisms whereby the aggregate employment 
implications of wage determination are taken into account when wage bargains are struck.  
This may be achieved if wage bargaining is highly centralised, as in Austria, or if there are 
institutions, such as employers’ federations, which can assist bargainers to act in concert even 
when bargaining itself ostensibly occurs at the level of the firm or industry, as in Germany or 
Japan (see Soskice, 1991).  It is worth noting that co-ordination is not, therefore, the same as 
centralisation which refers simply to the level at which bargaining takes place (plant, firm, 
industry or economy-wide).  In Table 14, we present co-ordination indices for the OECD 
from the 1960s.  The first index (co-ord 1) basically ignores transient changes whereas the 
second (co-ord 2) tries to capture the various detailed nuances of the variations in the 
institutional structure. Notable changes are the increases in co-ordination in Ireland and the 
Netherlands towards the end of the period and the declines in co-ordination in Australia, New 
Zealand and Sweden.  Co-ordination also declines in the UK over the same period but this 
simply reflects the sharp decline of unionism overall. 
 
Employment protection 
 
Employment protection laws are thought by many to be a key factor in generating labour 
market inflexibility.  Despite this, evidence that they have a decisive impact on overall rates 
of unemployment is mixed, at best.15  In Table 15, we present details of an employment 
protection index for the OECD countries.  Features to note are the wide variation in the index 
across countries and the fact that, in some countries, the basic legislation was not introduced 
until the 1970s. 
 
Labour taxes 
 
The important taxes here are those that form part of the wedge between the real product wage 
(labour costs per employee normalised on the output price) and the real consumption wage 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
this is only a minor part of their activities.  And these are already accounted for in our analysis of density, 
coverage and co-ordination. 
15 The results presented by Lazear (1990), Addison and Grosso (1996), Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Elmeskov 
et al. (1998), Nickell and Layard (1999) do not add up to anything very decisive although there is a clear 
positive relationship between employment protection and long-term unemployment. 
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(after tax pay normalised on the consumer price index).  These are payroll taxes, income 
taxes and consumption taxes.  Their combined impact on unemployment remains a subject of 
some debate despite the large number of empirical investigations.  Indeed some studies 
indicate that employment taxes have no long run impact on unemployment whatever whereas 
others present results which imply that they can explain more or less all the rise in 
unemployment in most countries during the 1960-1985 period.16  In Table 16 we present the 
total tax rate on labour for the OECD countries.  All countries exhibit a substantial increase 
over the period from the 1960s to the 1990s although there are wide variations across 
countries.  These mainly reflect the extent to which health, higher education and pensions are 
publicly provided along with the all- round generosity of the social security system.  Some 
countries have made significant attempts to reduce labour taxes in recent years, notably the 
Netherlands and the UK. 
 
Labour market institutions and the successes and failures of the 1990s 
 
Having looked at some of the key factors which the evidence suggests have some impact on 
equilibrium unemployment, let us see how changes in these variables over the last two 
decades can contribute to our understanding of unemployment changes over the same period.  
In Table 17, we provide a picture of changes in the relevant variables with a tick referring to 
a significant move which will tend to reduce unemployment and a cross for the reverse.  
Double ticks and crosses reflect really big moves.  A dash implies no significant change.  Of 
course, this is a pretty crude business and a proper panel data analysis is arguable preferable.  
However, here we are able to take account of variables where we are unable to obtain long 
time series.  Readers who prefer panel data analysis can consult the papers discussed in 
Section 5. 
 So we can ask the question, do the ticks and crosses bear any relationship to the 
unemployment changes reported in the final columns of the table?  If we regress the 
unemployment change on the number of ticks and crosses we obtain: 
Unemployment change (%)  =  0.25  –1.25 tic ks   +1.21 crosses   ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
=
=
20
51.02
N
R
 
(80/87 to 00/01)       (3.1)           (2.2) 
                                                                 
16 A good example of a study in this latter group is Daveri and Tabellini (2000) whereas one in the former group 
is OECD (1990, Annex 6).  Extensive discussions may be found in Nickell and Layard (1999), Section 6, 
Disney (2000) and Pissarides (1998). 
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Or, in restricted form, 
Unemployment change (%)  =  -0.42  -1.24 (ticks-crosses)  ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
=
=
20
51.02
N
R
 
(80/87 to 00/01)       (4.3)  
The restriction is easily accepted.  So the number of ticks and crosses explains about half the 
cross-country variation in unemployment changes from the early 80s to the present day.  We 
may reasonably conclude that the countries which had very high unemployment in the early 
1980s and still have high unemployment today simply have too few ticks and/or too many 
crosses. 
 
 
7.  Summary and Conclusions  
 
Average unemployment in Europe today is relatively high compared with OECD countries 
outside Europe.  The majority of countries in Europe today have lower unemployment than 
any OECD country outside Europe, including the US.  These two facts are consistent because 
the four largest countries in Continental Western Europe namely, France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, (the Big Four), have very high unemployment and most of the rest have comparatively 
low unemployment.  This variability is highly informative because the fifteen European 
countries which we consider have more or less independent labour markets in practice, 
despite ‘free’ movement of labour.  Using this information we see how changes in the 
structure of the various labour markets explain a substantial proportion of the secular 
fluctuations in unemployment in the various countries.  In particular, we pin down some of 
the particular factors which enable us to understand why some European countries have been 
able fully to recover from the unemployment disasters of the early 1980s whereas some have 
not. 
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 Table 1 
A Picture of Employment and Unemployment in the OECD in 2001 
 
 
 
Unemployment (%) Inac tivity 
Rate (%) 
Employment 
Rate (%) 
Hours per 
year 
 2001 2002 
(latest 
data)** 
   
Europe      
Austria 3.6 4.1 29.3 67.8 - 
Belgium 6.6 6.9 36.4 59.7 1528 
Denmark 4.3 4.2 21.8 75.9 1482 
Finland 9.1 8.9 25.4 67.7 1694 
France 8.6 9.2 32.0 62.0 1532 
Germany 7.9 8.3 28.4 65.9 1467 
Ireland 3.8 4.4 32.5 65.0 1674 
Italy 9.5 9.2 39.3 54.9 1606 
Netherlands 2.4 2.8 24.3 74.1 1346 
Norway 3.6 3.9 19.7 77.5 1364 
Portugal 4.1 4.4 28.2 68.7 - 
Spain 10.7 11.2 34.2 58.8 1816 
Sweden 5.1 5.0 20.7 75.3 1603 
Switze rland 2.6 2.6 18.8 79.1 1568* 
UK 5.0 5.2 25.1 71.3 1711 
EU 
 
Non-Europe 
7.6 - 30.8 64.1 - 
 
Australia 6.7 6.5 26.2 68.9 1837 
Canada 7.2 7.5 23.5 70.9 1801* 
Japan 5.0 5.4 27.4 68.8 1821* 
New Zealand 5.3 5.3 24.1 71.8 1817 
US 4.8 5.6 23.2 73.1 1821 
 
*refers to 2000.  **refers to the period between Feb and Aug 2002. 
 
OECD Employment Outlook 2002, Tables A, B, F. 
 
Unemployment is based on OECD standardised rates.  These approximate the ILO definition.  Hours per year 
is an average over all workers, part-t ime and full time. 
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Table 2 
Long-Term Unemployment in 2001 (over 12 months) 
 
 Long-Term Unemployment 
Rate 
Short-Term Unemployment 
Rate 
Europe   
Austria 0.8 2.8 
Belgium 3.4 3.2 
Denmark 1.0 3.3 
Finland 2.4 6.7 
France 3.2 5.4 
Germany 4.1 3.8 
Ireland 2.1 1.7 
Italy 5.7 3.8 
Netherlands 0.4 2.0 
Norway 0.2 3.4 
Portugal 1.6 2.5 
Spain 5.7 7.3 
Sweden 1.1 4.0 
Switzerland 0.8 1.8 
UK 1.4 3.6 
EU 
 
3.3 4.3 
Non-Europe   
Australia 1.4 5.3 
Canada 0.7 6.5 
Japan 1.3 3.7 
New Zealand 1.0 4.3 
US 0.3 4.5 
 
Based on OECD Employment Outlook 2002, Table G.
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Table 3 
 
Unemployment, Inactivity and Employment by Age and Gender in 2001 
 
 
Unemployment (%) Inactivity Rate (%) Employment Rate (%) 
 Men Women Men Women Men Women 
 25-54 55-64 25-54 55-64 25-54 55-64 25-54 55-64 25-54 55-64 25-54 55-64 
Europe             
Austria 3.4 5.7 3.8 5.2 6.5 59.8 23.1 81.7 90.3 37.9 74.0 17.4 
Belgium 4.8 3.9 6.1 0.9 9.1 63.4 29.3 84.2 86.5 35.1 66.4 15.6 
Denmark 2.9 4.0 4.1 4.0 8.6 34.3 16.5 48.1 88.7 63.1 80.1 49.8 
Finland 6.9 8.9 8.0 8.8 9.0 48.8 15.0 50.5 84.7 46.7 78.2 45.1 
France 6.3 5.6 10.1 6.6 5.9 56.2 21.3 65.9 88.1 41.4 70.8 31.8 
Germany 7.3 10.3 7.7 12.5 5.7 49.4 21.7 67.6 87.5 45.4 72.2 28.4 
Ireland 3.4 2.6 3.0 2.7 8.2 33.6 33.9 70.8 88.7 64.6 64.1 28.4 
Italya 6.4 4.6 12.5 4.9 9.6 57.8 42.1 84.1 84.6 40.3 50.7 15.2 
Netherlands 1.4 1.7 2.1 1.1 6.0 48.6 25.8 71.7 92.7 50.5 72.6 28.0 
Norway 2.7 1.7 2.5 1.4 8.6 26.4 16.7 36.8 88.9 72.3 81.2 62.3 
Portugal 2.6 3.2 4.4 3.1 7.2 36.4 21.9 58.1 90.4 61.6 74.7 40.6 
Spain 6.3 5.6 13.7 8.0 8.4 38.6 38.8 76.4 85.9 57.9 52.8 21.8 
Sweden 4.4 5.3 3.7 4.5 9.4 26.5 14.4 32.7 86.6 69.6 82.5 64.3 
Switzerland 1.0 1.8 3.4 1.6 3.7 17.5 20.7 43.8 95.3 81.0 76.6 55.3 
UK 4.1 4.4 3.6 1.8 8.7 35.6 23.6 56.0 87.6 61.6 73.6 43.2 
EU 5.5 6.3 7.9 6.6 8.2 47.8 28.4 68.1 86.8 48.9 66.0 29.8 
 
Non-Europe 
            
Australia 5.5 5.6 5.0 3.3 10.1 40.0 28.6 63.1 85.0 43.3 67.8 35.7 
Canada 6.3 6.0 6.0 5.6 8.9 38.8 20.9 58.2 85.4 57.6 74.3 39.4 
Japan 4.2 7.0 4.7 3.7 3.1 16.6 32.7 50.8 92.8 77.5 64.1 47.3 
New Zealand 4.0 4.0 4.1 2.8 8.7 25.7 25.5 48.2 87.6 71.3 71.5 50.3 
US 3.7 3.4 3.8 2.7 8.7 31.9 23.6 47.0 87.9 65.8 73.5 51.6 
a) 2000 
OECD Employment Outlook 2002, Table C. 
Note: These data do not include those in prison.  This makes little odds except in the US where  counting those in prison would raise the inactivity rate among prime age 
men by around 2  percentage points. 
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Table 4 
 
Youth Unemployment Rate (%), 2001 
 
Age 15-24 
 
 Total Men Women 
Europe    
Austria 6.0 6.2 5.8 
Belgium 15.3 14.3 16.6 
Denmark 8.3 7.3 9.3 
Finland 19.9 19.6 20.2 
France 18.7 16.2 21.8 
Germany 8.4 9.1 7.5 
Ireland 6.2 6.4 5.8 
Italy 27.0 23.2 32.2 
Netherlands 4.4 4.2 4.5 
Norway 10.5 10.6 10.3 
Portugal 9.2 7.2 11.9 
Spain 20.8 16.1 27.0 
Sweden 11.8 12.7 10.8 
Switzerland 5.6 5.8 5.5 
UK 10.5 12.0 8.7 
EU 13.9 13.1 15.0 
 
Non-Europe 
   
Australia 12.7 13.3 12.0 
Canada 12.8 14.5 11.0 
Japan 9.7 10.7 8.7 
New Zealand 11.8 12.1 11.5 
US 10.6 11.4 9.7 
 
OECD Employment Outlook 2002, Table C. 
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Table 5 
 
Unemployment (Standardised Rate) % 
 
 1960-64 1965-72 1973-79 1980-87 1988-95 1996-99 2000-1 Latest data 
         
Australia 2.5 1.9 4.6 7.7 8.7 7.8 6.5 6.5 
Austria 1.6 1.4 1.4 3.1 3.6 4.3 3.7 4.1 
Belgium 2.3 2.3 5.8 11.2 8.4 9.2 6.8 6.9 
Canada 5.5 4.7 6.9 9.7 9.5 8.7 7.0 7.5 
Denmark 2.2 1.7 4.1 7.0 8.1 5.3 4.4 4.2 
Finland 1.4 2.4 4.1 5.1 9.9 12.2 9.4 8.9 
France 1.5 2.3 4.3 8.9 10.5 11.9 9.0 9.2 
Germany (W) 0.8 0.8 2.9 6.1 5.6 7.1 6.4 6.8 
Ireland 5.1 5.3 7.3 13.8 14.7 8.9 4.0 4.4 
Italy 3.5 4.2 4.5 6.7 8.1 9.9 8.4 7.6 
Japan 1.4 1.3 1.8 2.5 2.5 3.9 4.9 5.4 
Netherlands 0.9 1.7 4.7 10.0 7.2 4.7 2.6 2.8 
Norway 2.2 1.7 1.8 2.4 5.2 3.9 3.6 3.9 
New Zealand 0.0 0.3 0.7 4.7 8.1 6.8 5.7 5.3 
Portugal 2.3 2.5 5.5 7.8 5.4 5.9 4.1 4.4 
Spain 2.4 2.7 4.9 17.6 19.6 19.4 13.5 - 
Spain*      15.8 11.0 11.2 
Sweden 1.2 1.6 1.6 2.3 5.1 8.7 5.5 5.0 
Switzerland 0.2 0.0 0.8 1.8 2.8 3.7 2.6 2.6 
UK 2.6 3.1 4.8 10.5 8.8 6.9 5.2 5.2 
USA 5.5 4.3 6.4 7.6 6.1 4.8 4.4 5.7 
 
Notes.  As far as possible, these numbers correspond to the OECD standardised rates and conform to the ILO 
definition.  The exception here is Italy where we use the US Bureau of Labor Statistics “unemployment rates on 
US concepts”.  In particular we use the correction to the OECD standardised rates made by the Bureau prior to 
1993.  This generates a rate which is 1.6 percentage points below the OECD standardised rate after 1993.  The 
rates referred to in Spain* refer to recently revised ILO rates.  For earlier years we use the data reported in 
Layard et al. (1991), Table A 3.  For later years we use OECD Employment Outlook (2002) and UK 
Employment Trends, published by the UK Department of Education and Employment.  The latest data refer to 
the period between February and September 2002. 
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Table 6 
 
Macroeconomic Patterns in the Eurozone, 1994-2002 
 
 94 95 96 97 98 99 00(i) 00(ii) 
 
00(iii) 
Short-term interest rate (%) 5.3 4.5 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.0 3.5 4.3 4.7 
Final domestic demand 
contribution to growth 
(annual %) 
1.5 1.7 1.5 1.7 3.1 3.6 3.1 3.5 2.6 
GDP growth (annual %) 2.4 2.2 1.4 2.3 2.9 2.8 3.8 4.2 3.2 
Unemployment  Rate (%) 10.9 10.6 10.9 10.9 10.3 9.3 8.7 8.5 8.3 
Inflation (CPI) 
 
2.8 2.6 2.3 1.7 1.2 1.1 2.1 2.1 2.5 
 
 
00(iv) 01(i) 01(ii) 01(iii) 01(iv) 02(i) 02(ii) 02(iii) 02(iv) 
Short-term interest rate (%) 5.0 4.8 4.6 4.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.1 
Final domestic demand 
contribution to growth 
(annual %) 
2.2 1.9 1.4 1.1 0.6 0.0 -0.2 0.2 0.5 
GDP growth (annual %) 2.7 2.4 1.6 1.3 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.8 1.1 
Unemployment Rate (%) 8.1 7.9 7.8 7.8 7.9 8.0 8.2 8.3 8.4 
Inflation (CPI) 2.7 2.3 3.1 2.5 2.2 2.6 2.1 2.1 2.0 
 
Notes: The quarterly annual growth rates are based on the current quarter relative to  
  the same quarter one year earlier.  Final domestic demand is C+I+G in obvious  
  notation. 
  These data are from the Bank of England databank. 
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Table 7 
 
Examples of Unemployment and Inflation Patterns  
 
 
 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 
 
Finland u 5.0 4.5 3.2 3.2 6.6 11.6 16.4 16.7 15.2 14.5 12.6 11.4 10.2 9.7 9.1 
           p&  3.6 4.7 6.5 6.1 4.1 2.6 2.2 1.0 1.0 0.6 1.2 1.4 1.2 3.4 2.5 
                
Japan u 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.9 3.1 3.4 3.4 4.1 4.7 4.7 5.0 
        p&  0.1 0.7 2.3 3.1 3.2 1.8 1.2 0.7 -0.1 0.1 1.8 0.6 -0.3 -0.7 -0.7 
 
 
 u is the ILO unemployment rate. 
p&  is the CPI inflation rate. 
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Table 8 
 
Unemployment Benefit Replacement Ratios, 1960-95 
 
 1960-64 1965-72 1973-79 1980-87 1988-95 1999 
       
Australia 0.18 0.15 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.25 
Austria 0.15 0.17 0.30 0.34 0.34 0.42 
Belgium 0.37 0.40 0.55 0.50 0.48 0.46 
Canada 0.39 0.43 0.59 0.57 0.58 0.49 
Denmark 0.25 0.35 0.55 0.67 0.64 0.66 
Finland 0.13 0.18 0.29 0.38 0.53 0.54 
France 0.48 0.51 0.56 0.61 0.58 0.59 
Germany (W) 0.43 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.37 
Ireland 0.21 0.24 0.44 0.50 0.40 0.35 
Italy 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.26 0.60* 
Japan 0.36 0.38 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.37 
Netherlands 0.39 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.70 0.70 
Norway 0.12 0.13 0.28 0.56 0.62 0.62 
New Zealand 0.37 0.30 0.27 0.30 0.29 0.30 
Portugal - - 0.17 0.44 0.65 0.65 
Spain 0.35 0.48 0.62 0.75 0.68 0.63 
Sweden 0.11 0.16 0.57 0.70 0.72 0.74 
Switzerland 0.04 0.02 0.21 0.48 0.61 0.74 
UK 0.27 0.36 0.34 0.26 0.22 0.17 
US 0.22 0.23 0.28 0.30 0.26 0.29 
 
Source:  OECD.  Based on the replacement ratio in the first year of an unemployment spell averaged over three 
family types.  See OECD (1994), Table 8.1 for an example. 
*  This number refers to the ‘mobility’ benefit, paid to those who become unemployed as a result of a collective 
layoff.  Most Italian unemployed do not fall under this category. 
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Table 9 
 
Unemployment Benefit Duration Index, 1960-95 
 
 1960-64 1965-72 1973-79 1980-87 1988-95 1999 
       
Australia 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.00 
Austria 0 0 0.69 0.75 0.74 0.68 
Belgium 1.0 0.96 0.78 0.79 0.77 0.78 
Canada 0.33 0.31 0.20 0.25 0.22 0.42 
Denmark 0.63 0.66 0.66 0.62 0.84 1.00 
Finland 0 0.14 0.72 0.61 0.53 0.63 
France 0.28 0.23 0.19 0.37 0.49 0.47 
Germany 0.57 0.57 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.75 
Ireland 0.68 0.78 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.77 
Italy 0 0 0 0 0.13 0 
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 0.12 0.35 0.53 0.66 0.57 0.64 
Norway 0 0.07 0.45 0.49 0.50 0.60 
New 
Zealand 
1.02 1.02 1.02 1.04 1.04 1.00 
Portugal - - 0 0.11 0.35 0.58 
Spain 0 0 0.01 0.21 0.27 0.29 
Sweden 0 0 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02 
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0.18 0.31 
UK 0.87 0.59 0.54 0.71 0.70 0.96 
US 0.12 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.22 
 
Source:  OECD.  Based on [0.06 (replacement ratio in 2nd and 3rd years of a spell) + 0.04 (replacement ratio in 
4th and 5th year of a spell)] ÷ (replacement ratio in 1st year of a spell). 
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Table 10 
 
Index of the Strictness of Work Availability Conditions, Mid-1990s 
 
 
 
Australia 3.6 Japan - 
Austria 2.3 Netherlands 3.7 
Belgium 3.1 Norway 3.3 
Canada 2.8 New Zealand 2.7 
Denmarka 3.0 Portugal 2.8 
Finland 2.7 Spain - 
France 2.7 Sweden 3.7 
Germany 2.6 Switzerland - 
Ireland 1.7 UK 2.6 
Italy - US 3.3 
 
Source: Danish Ministry of Finance (1999), The Danish Economy Medium Term Economic Survey, Figure  2.4 
d. 
a) This refers to 1998.  In the early 1990s, the corresponding number was 2.3. 
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Table 11 
 
Expenditure on Active Labour Market Policies (%GDP) 
 
(In brackets, we present the figure normalised on the percent unemployment rate) 
 1985 1989 1993 1998 
     
Australia 0.42 (0.051) 0.24 (0.039) 0.71 (0.065) 0.42 (0.053) 
Austria 0.27 (0.075) 0.27 (0.084) 0.32 (0.080) 0.44 (0.098) 
Belgium 1.31 (0.12) 1.26 (0.16) 1.24 (0.14) 1.42 (0.15) 
Canada 0.64 (0.062) 0.51 (0.068) 0.66 (0.058) 0.50 (0.052) 
Denmark 1.14 (0.13) 1.13 (0.12) 1.74 (0.17)  1.66 (0.32) 
Finland 0.90 (0.18) 0.97 (0.26) 1.69 (0.10) 1.40 (0.12) 
France 0.66 (0.065) 0.73 (0.078) 1.25 (0.11) 1.30 (0.11) 
Germany 0.80 (0.11) 1.03 (0.18)  1.53 (0.19) 1.26 (0.14) 
Ireland 1.52 (0.087) 1.41 (0.096) 1.54 (0.099) 1.54 (0.21) 
Italy - - 1.36 (0.13) 1.12 (0.095) 
Japan 0.17 (0.065) 0.16 (0.070) 0.09 (0.036) 0.09 (0.022) 
Netherlands 1.16 (0.11) 1.25 (0.15) 1.59 (0.24) 1.74 (0.42) 
Norway 0.61 (0.23) 0.81 (0.17) 1.15 (0.19) 0.90 (0.27) 
New Zealand 0.90 (0.25) 0.93 (0.13) 0.79 (0.083) 0.63 (0.084) 
Portugal 0.33 0.48 0.84 (0.15)  0.78 (0.15) 
Spain 0.33 (0.015) 0.85 (0.050) 0.50 (0.022) 070 (0.037) 
Sweden 2.10 (0.88) 1.54 (1.10) 2.97 (0.34) 1.97 (0.24) 
Switzerland 0.19 (0.079) 0.21 (0.12) 0.38 (0.095) 0.77 (0.22) 
UK 0.75 (0.067) 0.67 (0.093) 0.57 (0.054) 0.34 (0.054) 
US 0.25 (0.035) 0.23 (0.044) 0.21 (0.030) 0.17 (0.038) 
 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, 2001, Table 1.5
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Table 12 
 
Collective bargaining coverage (%) 
 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1994 
 
 
Austria 
 
n.a. 
 
n.a. 
 
n.a. 
 
n.a. 
 
n.a. 
 
n.a. 
 
99 
 
99 
Australia 85 85 85 85 85 85 80 80 
Belgium 80 80 80 85 90 90 90 90 
Canada 35 33 36 39 40 39 38 36 
Denmark 67 68 68 70 72 74 69 69 
Finland 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 
France n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 85 n.a. 92 95 
Germany 90 90 90 90 91 90 90 92 
Ireland n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Italy 91 90 88 85 85 85 83 82 
Japan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 28 n.a. 23 21 
Netherlands 100 n.a. n.a. n.a. 76 80 n.a. 85 
New Zealand n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 67 31 
Norway 65 65 65 65 70 70 70 70 
Portugal n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 70 n.a. 79 71 
Spain n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 68 70 76 78 
Sweden n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 86 89 
Switzerland n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 53 53 
United Kingdom 67 67 68 72 70 64 54 40 
United States 29 27 27 24 21 21 18 17 
 
These data were collected by Wolfgang Ochel.  Further details may be found in Ochel (2000). 
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Table 13 
 
Union Density (%) 
 
 1960-64 1965-72 1973-79 1980-87 1988-95  1996-98 Extension 
laws in 
place (a) 
       
Australia 48 45 49 49 43          35       ü 
Austria 59 57 52 51 45          39   ü 
Belgium 40 42 52 52 52           - ü 
Canada 27 29 35 37 36          36         X 
Denmark 60 61 71 79 76          76  X 
Finland 35 47 66 69 76          80 ü 
France 20 21 21 16 10          10 ü 
Germany (W) 34 32 35 34 31          27 ü 
Ireland 47 51 56 56 51          43 X 
Italy 25 32 48 45 40          37  ü 
Japan 33 33 30 27 24          22 X 
Netherlands 41 38 37 30 24          24 ü 
Norway 52 51 52 55 56          55 X 
New Zealand 36 35 38 37 35          21 X 
Portugal 61 61 61 57 34          25 ü 
Spain  9  9  9 11 16          18 ü 
Sweden 64 66 76 83 84          87 X 
Switzerland 35 32 32 29 25          23  ü (b) 
UK 44 47 55 53 42          35 X 
USA 27 26 25 20 16          14 X 
 
 
Notes  
(i) Union density = union members as a percentage of employees.  In both Spain and Portugal, union 
membership in the 1960s and 1970s does not have the same implications as elsewhere because there 
was pervasive government intervention in wage determination during most of this period. 
 
(ii) (a) Effectively, bargained wages extended to non-union firms typically at the behest of 
one party to the bargain. 
 
(b) Extension only at the behest of both parties to a bargain.  For details, see OECD (1994), Table 
5.11. 
 
(iii) Source:  Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000). 
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Table 14 
Co-ordination Indices (Range 1-3) 
 
 1960-64 1965-72 1973-79 1980-87 1988-95 1995-99 
 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 
            
Australia 2.25 2 2.25 2 2.25 2.36 2.25 2.31 1.92 1.63 1.5 
Austria 3 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.42 2 
Belgium 2 2 2 2 2 2.1 2 2.55 2 2 2 
Canada 1 1 1 1 1 1.63 1 1.08 1 1 1 
Denmark 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.5 2.96 2.4 2.54 2.26 2.42 2 
Finland 2.25 1.5 2.25 1.69 2.25 2 2.25 2 2.25 2.38 2.5 
France 1.75 2 1.75 2 1.75 2 1.84 2 1.98 1.92 1.5 
Germany (W) 3 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.5 2.5 
Ireland 2 2 2 2.38 2 2.91 2 2.08 3 2.75 3 
Italy 1.5 1.94 1.5 1.73 1.5 2 1.5 1.81 1.4 1.95 2.5 
Japan 3 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.5 2.5 
Netherlands 2 3 2 2.56 2 2 2 2.38 2 3 3 
Norway 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.5 2.96 2.5 2.72 2.5 2.84 2 
New Zealand 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 1.32 2.32 1 1.25 1 
Portugal 1.75 3 1.75 3 1.75 2.56 1.84 1.58 2 1.88 2 
Spain 2 3 2 3 2 2.64 2 2.3 2 2 2 
Sweden 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.41 2.53 2.15 1.94 2 
Switzerland 2.25 2 2.25 2 2.25 2 2.25 2 2.25 1.63 1.5 
UK 1.5 1.56 1.5 1.77 1.5 1.77 1.41 1.08 1.15 1 1 
US 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
 
Notes  
 
The first series (1) only moves in response to major changes, the second series (2) attempts to capture all the 
nuances.  Co-ordination 1 was provided by Michèle Belot to whom much thanks (see Belot and van Ours, 2000, 
for details).  Co-ordination 2 is the work of Wolfgang Ochel, to whom we are most grateful (see Ochel, 2000a).  
Co-ordination 1 appears in all the subsequent regressions. 
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Table 15 
 
Employment Protection (Index, 0-2) 
 
 
 1960-64 1965-72 1973-79 1980-87 1988-95 1998 
       
Australia 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Austria 0.65 0.65 0.84 1.27 1.30 1.10 
Belgium 0.72 1.24 1.55 1.55 1.35 1.00 
Canada 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 
Denmark 0.90 0.98 1.10 1.10 0.90 0.70 
Finland 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.13 1.00 
France 0.37 0.68 1.21 1.30 1.41 1.40 
Germany (W) 0.45 1.05 1.65 1.65 1.52 1.30 
Ireland 0.02 0.19 0.45 0.50 0.52 0.50 
Italy 1.92 1.99 2.00 2.00 1.89 1.50 
Japan 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 
Netherlands 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.28 1.10 
Norway 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.46 1.30 
New Zealand 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
Portugal 0.00 0.43 1.59 1.94 1.93 1.70 
Spain 2.00 2.00 1.99 1.91 1.74 1.40 
Sweden 0.00 0.23 1.46 1.80 1.53 1.10 
Switzerland 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 
UK 0.16 0.21 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.35 
USA 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
 
 
Note 
 
These data are based on an interpolation of the variable used by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), to whom we are 
most grateful.  This variable is based on the series used by Lazear (1990) and that provided by the OECD for the 
late 1980s and 1990s.  Since the Lazear index and the OECD index are not strictly comparable, the overall series 
is not completely reliable.  The 1998 number is taken from Nicoletti et al. (2000), Table A3.11 (1st col. 
rescaled). 
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Table 16 
 
Total Taxes on Labour 
 
Payroll Tax Rate plus Income Tax Rate plus Consumption Tax Rate 
 
Total Tax Rate (%) 
 
 1960-64 1965-72 1973-79 1980-87 1988-95 1996-2000 
      
Australia 28 31 36 39 -                      - 
Austria 47 52 55 58 59                    66 
Belgium 38 43 44 46 49                    51  
Canada 31 39 41 42 50                    53 
Denmark 32 46 53 59 60                    61  
Finland 38 46 55 58 64                    62 
France 55 57 60 65 67                    68 
Germany (W) 43 44 48 50 52                    50 
Ireland 23 30 30 37 41                    33 
Italy 57 56 54 56 67                    64 
Japan 25 25 26 33 33                    37  
Netherlands 45 54 57 55 47                    43 
Norway - 52 61 65 61                    60 
New Zealand - - 29 30 -                      - 
Portugal 20 25 26 33 41                    39 
Spain 19 23 29 40 46                    45 
Sweden 41 54 68 77 78                    77 
Switzerland 30 31 35 36 36                    36 
UK 34 43 45 51 47                    44 
USA 34 37 42 44 45                    45 
 
 
Note:  These data are based on the London School of Economics, Centre for Economic Performance OECD 
dataset. 
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Table 17 
 
From the Early 1980s to the Late 1990s 
‘Policy’ Changes 
 
 Replacement 
Rate 
Benefit 
Duration 
Benefit 
Strictness 
ALMP Union 
Coverage 
Union 
Density 
Co-
ordination 
 
Europe        
Austria X - - - - v X 
Belgium v - - - - - X 
Denmark - X v vv - - X 
Finland X - - - - X v 
France - X - v X - X 
Germany - X - v - - - 
Ireland v X - - ? v v 
Italy X - - - - - v 
Netherlands - - v v - - v 
Norway X X v v - - X 
Portugal X X - v - vv - 
Spain v - - - X - - 
Sweden X - - - - - X 
Switzerland XX X - v - - X 
UK 
 
v X v X vv v - 
Non-Europe        
Australia - - v v - v X 
Canada v X - - - - - 
Japan X - - - - - - 
New Zealand - - - X vv v XX 
US - - v - - - - 
 
Notes: 
(i)  v  implies ‘good’ shift, X implies ‘bad’ shift. 
(ii) See Table 8.  Replacement rate change (1980-87 to 1999) greater than 0.04 implies X, less than –0.04 
implies v.  Double X or v for changes in excess of 0.25.  The latter does not apply to Italy because the 
figure in the 1999 column refers to so few people.    
(iv) See Table 9.  Duration index change (1980-87 to 1999) greater than 0.1 implies X, less than 
-0.1 implies v.  Double X or v for changes in excess of 0.5.   
(v) See Table 10 and the discussion in OECD (2000), Chapter 4.  Author’s judgment based on this 
information. 
(vi) See Table 11.  Change (1985/9 to 1993/8) greater than 0.2 implies v, less than –0.2 implies X.  Double 
v or X for changes in excess of 0.5.  Bracketed amount must move in the same direction by 0.05. 
(vii) See Table 12.  Coverage change (1980 to 1994) greater than 0.1 implies X, less than –0.1 implies v.  
Double X or v for changes in excess of 0.3. 
(viii) See Table 13.  Density change (1980-87 to 1996-8) greater than 10 implies X, less than –10 implies v.  
Double X or v for changes in excess of 30. 
(ix) See Table 14.  Co-ordination (Type 2) change (1980-87 to 1995-99) greater than 0.5 implies v, less 
than –0.5 implies X. Double X or v for changes in excess of 1.0. 
(x) See Table 15.  Employment protection change (1980-87 to 1998) greater than 0.2 implies v, less than –
0.1 implies X. See Table 16.  Taxes and change (1980-87 or 1988-95 to 1996-2000) greater than 0.07 
implies X, less than –0.07 implies v.  
 
 
  
 
38 
Table 17 – cont’d 
 
      
 Employment Labour Total Unemployment Unemployment 
 
Europe 
Protection 
 
Taxes v X 1980-87 2000-01 Change 
Austria - X 1 3 3.1 3.7 0.6 
Belgium v - 2 1 11.2 6.8 -4.4 
Denmark v - 4 2 7.0 4.4 -2.6 
Finland v - 2 2 5.1 9.4 4.3 
France X - 1 4 8.9 9.0 0.1 
Germany v - 2 1 6.1 6.4 0.3 
Ireland - v 4 1 13.8 4.0 -9.8 
Italy v X 2 2 6.7 8.4 1.7 
Netherlands v v 5 0 10.0 2.6 -7.4 
Norway v - 3 3 2.4 3.6 1.2 
Portugal v - 4 2 7.8 4.1 -3.7 
Spain v - 2 1 17.6 13.5 -4.1 
Sweden v - 1 2 2.3 5.5 3.2 
Switzerland - - 1 4 1.8 2.6 0.8 
UK - v 6 2 10.5 5.2 -5.3 
 
Non-Europe 
       
Australia - ? 3 1 7.7 6.5 -1.2 
Canada - X 1 2 9.7 7.0 -2.7 
Japan - - 0 1 2.5 4.9 2.4 
New Zealand - ? 3 3 4.7 5.7 1.0 
US - - 1 0 7.6 4.4 -3.2 
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Figure 1 
 
Unemployment/Vacancy Loci in France, Germany and Spain 
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Figure 2 
 
Unemployment/Vacancy Loci in Britain, Denmark, Netherlands  
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